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DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
The following legal provisions are determinative and are set forth verbatim in
the Addendum to the Brief of Appellants:
Utah Constitution Art. I, § 10;
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-21-1 and -2;
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and 39.
(Add. 20-25.)
COMMENT ON APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF FACTS
Approximately three pages of Appellees' brief is dedicated to summarizing the
trial court's determination of facts. As expected, Appellees describe the trial court's
determination in a way that favors their defense to this appeal. To characterize the
trial court's findings of fact, as opposed to the jury's findings of fact, as the "facts" of
this case is misleading and begs the question presented by this case; namely, from a
procedural and constitutional point of view, whose determination of facts should
control, the jury's or the trial court's. For this reason, Appellants object to any
consideration given to Appellees' statement of fact relating to the alleged violation of
the CC&Rs.
In addition, Appellants object to Appellees' statement of fact because Appellees'
summary of the trial court's findings of fact is completely irrelevant to the procedural
issue presented by this Appeal. The relevant facts are completely, yet concisely, stated

-1-

as follows: (1) before trial both parties formally requested a trial by jury on all issues
(R. 232-241, 415-417, 553-554, 901-902), (2) this case was tried in its entirety before a
jury (R. 1226), (3) at the close of evidence, Appellees did not make a motion for a
directed verdict and thereby acknowledged that there was sufficient evidence to require
that the case, be submitted to the jury, (4) the jury was instructed on the law and, in
particular, they were directed to find whether a breach of the CC&Rs had occurred
and whether damages should be awarded (R. 1152-1189), (5) based on the evidence
presented at trial, the jury concluded that Appellees had failed to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Appellants' residence violated the Evergreen
CC&Rs (R. 1226), (6) it was not until after the jury rendered its verdict that Appellees
asked the court for the first time to treat the jury as advisory and disregard the jury's
verdict (R. 1258-1286), and (7) upon Appellees' request, the trial court entered findings
of fact that were inconsistent with the jury's verdict (R. 1486-1487).
Appellants likewise object to the self-serving and misleading color photograph of
Appellants' residence which is reproduced at page 6 of Appellee's Brief. The primary
objection to this photograph is that it is evidence. Appellees are apparently trying to
retry this case at the appellate level. The sufficiency of the evidence to support the
jury's verdict or the trial court's findings is not at issue in this appeal. To refer to the
evidence presented at trial is therefore inappropriate.

J2r

Moreover, to refer to this particular photograph in a statement of "facts" is
especially misleading. It is common knowledge that photographs can distort reality
through carefully selected perspectives and by narrowing the scope of focus. However,
rather than being lured into responding to Appellees' photographic distraction with an
equally irrelevant essay on how photographs are not appropriate indicators of fact, it
seems sufficient to respond with the fact that the jury traveled as a group to the
premises in question as part of the presentation of evidence at trial, and after so doing,
found that Appellants' residence did not violate the CC&Rs. The jury's finding was
not based upon one carefully selected photograph but instead after having personally
viewed Appellants' residence and Appellees' residence in complete panoramic context
(R. 1128).

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

ROMRELL V. ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL RANK IS INAPPLICABLE
BECAUSE THE PARTIES IN ROMRELL STIPULATED THAT THE
CASE PROCEED ONLY AS AN EQUITY CASE WHILE THE CASE
AT HAND ALWAYS REMAINED A MIXED CASE OF EQUITY
AND LAW.

Appellees Gary Goldberg and Diana Meehan ("Goldberg and Meehan") argue
that Romrell v. Zions First National Bank NA.9 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980), is a
controlling precedent in this appeal. The facts of the case at hand, however, are
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markedly different from the facts in Romrell and, more importantly, the issues
presented in the present case are completely different from the issues addressed in
Romrell. Romrell is therefore inapplicable to the present case.
In Romrell, the plaintiff sought specific performance of a contract to sell real
estate and, alternatively, damages for breach of contract and fraud. Id. at 393. !The
parties stipulated in a pretrial order that should plaintiff be found entitled to specific
performance, her other claims for relief would be dismissed as moot." Id. at 393-94.
At the conclusion of trial, ff[t]he jury was instructed that if they found an oral contract
for the conveyance of the land in question, the contract could be enforced if there was
sufficient part performance on the part of plaintiff or if defendants had acted in such a
manner as to be estopped from asserting the statute of frauds." Id. at 395. The case
was submitted to the jury on a general verdict. The jury's general verdict was as
follows:
We, the jury empaneled in this action, hereby find the issues
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants and find
that the plaintiff is entitled to an order directing defendants
to convey to plaintiff the property in dispute.
DATED this 19th day of October, 1978.
John W. Peterson
Foreman
Id. at 394.
-4-

It is clear that Romrell was properly treated as an equity case. This is because
the parties' stipulated that it proceed as an equity case first and then, if equitable relief
were denied, that it proceed second as a case at law. In effect, by so stipulating, the
parties in Romrell waived their constitutional right to have the legal issues decided first
by the jury.
In the case at hand, the parties did not stipulate to the equity case being
decided first. Instead, the parties proposed jury instructions on the issues of whether
the CC&Rs had been violated and whether damages should be awarded; in other
words, on the legal issues of the case. The trial court so instructed the jury and the
jury rendered a special verdict finding there was no violation of the CC&Rs. Because
the jury found there was no violation of the CC&Rs, the jury never reached the
question of damages.
Another important distinction between Romrell and the case at hand is that the
jury's verdict was followed in Romrell and the jury's verdict was rejected in the present
case. The issue of whether or not a trial court can reject a jury's findings and enter its
own inconsistent findings of fact in a mixed case of equity and law was not even
addressed by Romrell.
Yet another very important distinction between Romrell and the case at hand is
that Romrell was decided before International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor
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and Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981), and Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Rocky
Mountain Irrigation, Inc., 795 P.2d 658 (Utah 1990). International Harvester recognized
for the first time in the State of Utah that Utah Const. Art. I, § 10 guarantees a right
to a jury trial in civil cases. Zions, decided nine years after International Harvester,
expands the ruling in International Harvester to require that Vhen legal and equitable
issues turn on the same operative facts, a jury must decide the legal issue first; the
jury's factual determination binds the trial court in its determination of the parallel
equitable issue." Zions, 795 P.2d at 662. The implication of International Harvester and
Zions on the case at hand are discussed in Point II of this brief. Also discussed in
Point II is a discussion of how Goldberg and Meehan's proposed interpretation of
Romrell is inconsistent with International Harvester and Zions.
In conclusion, because of the dramatic factual and procedural differences
between Romrell and the case at hand and because of the evolution of case law after
Romrell, the Romrell case has no application to the issues presented in this appeal.
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POINT H:

GOLDBERG AND MEEHAN'S INTERPRETATION OF ROMRELL
WOULD MAKE ROMRELL INCONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL
HARVESTER AND ZIONS AND GOLDBERG AND MEEHAN'S
PROPOSED APPLICATION OF ROMRELL TO THE PRESENT CASE
WOULD VIOLATE TIMMONS' (INSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL OF THE LEGAL ISSUES.

Goldberg and Meehan assert that under Romrell, whenever an equitable remedy
is sought as an alternative to a legal remedy, the trial court can simply disregard a
jury's findings of fact on the legal issues and enter its own inconsistent findings of fact
to support whatever equitable relief the court deems appropriate. Such an
interpretation, however, is totally inconsistent with the International Harvester and Zions
decisions. In International Harvester, as stated above, the Utah Supreme Court
addressed for the first time whether Art. I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution guarantees a
right to a jury trial in civil cases. Id. at 419. The plaintiff in International Harvester
had brought a claim for amounts due under a contract. The defendants requested a
trial by jury and the plaintiffs responded by arguing that the defendants had no
constitutional or statutory right to a trial by jury. The trial court granted plaintiffs
motion to strike the jury trial demand. On appeal, however, the Utah Supreme Court
remanded for a trial by jury, holding "that the right of jury trial in civil cases is
guaranteed by Art. I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution." Id. at 421.
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Plaintiff apparently argued on appeal in International Harvester that the
proceeding was equitable and therefore not triable to a jury. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, however, finding that the action "concerned only money
damages" and ftwas clearly a law action." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court went on to
state that even if the claim for damages was only incidental to a claim for equitable
relief, "a jury trial should be accorded the parties on the issues of fact raised in a legal
cause of action when legal relief is sought in conjunction with equitable relief." Id. at
421.
In deciding International Harvester, the Utah Supreme Court looked to the
United States Supreme Court's decisions in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469
(1962), and Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), which considered
the issue of a right to a jury trial in a civil action in light of the United States
Constitution's guarantee of the right to trial by jury on legal issues, 626 P.2d at 421 n.2.
In Beacon, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because "[maintenance
of the jury as a fact finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in
our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial
should be scrutinized with the utmost care." Beacon, 359 U.S. at 501. The plaintiff in
Beacon asked for an order enjoining defendant from violating antitrust laws and also
claimed treble damages as a result of past violations. The Beacon case, therefore, is
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factually similar to the case at hand; both cases involve claims for injunctive relief and
for damages resulting from alleged historical violations of applicable rules. The United
States Supreme Court noted in Beacon that the constitutional protection of the right to
a trial by jury with respect to legal claims would in effect be violated in cases that
involved a concurrent claim for equitable relief if the trial court were allowed to decide
the equitable issue first and then rely upon its own findings of fact, rather than the
jury's, to dismiss the legal action. Id. at 509-11.
In Dairy Queen, the plaintiff likewise sought both equitable and legal relief. The
United States Supreme Court in Dairy Queen noted that under the federal rules
allowing consolidation of equitable and legal claims,
attempts were made indirectly to undercut [the constitutional
right to a jury trial in civil actions] by having federal courts
in which cases involving both legal and equitable claims
were filed decide the equitable claim first. The result of
this procedure in those cases in which it was followed was
that any issue common to both the legal and equitable
claims was finally determined by the Court and the parties
seeking trial by jury on the legal claim was deprived of that
right as to these common issues.
392 U.S. at 472. The Court thus decided in Dairy Queen as follows:
We conclude therefore that the district judge erred in
refusing to grant petitioner's demand for a trial by jury on
the factual issues related to the question of whether there
has been a breach of contract. Since these issues are
common with those upon which respondent's claim to
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equitable relief is based, the legal claims involved in the
action must be determined prior to any final court
determination of respondent's equitable claims.
Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 479.
Before moving on, it should be noted that the International Harvester case was
decided nine months after the Romrell case. In the Court's instruction in International
Harvester on how trial courts should proceed in cases involving both equitable and legal
claims, the Romrell decision is not mentioned once. Instead, the Court refers back to
the earlier decisions of Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), and Valley Mortuary
v. Fairbanks, 225 P.2d 739 (Utah 1950), as controlling. This is further evidence that
the Romrell decision was not intended to be a ruling on the issues presented by this
appeal.
The rule of law in International Harvester was further clarified nine years later in
Zions. The plaintiff in Zions filed suit "to enforce notes, take possession of collateral
under security agreements, and to foreclose mortgages." Id. at 660. The defendant
asserted the affirmative defense that the notes had been materially and fraudulently
altered. Id. Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that the issue of whether the notes had
been altered was for the court to determine. Id. at 661. The Utah Supreme Court
ruled that the trial court committed reversible error in reserving this factual
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determination to itself. Id. at 662-63. The rationale of the Court in Zions was as
follows:
In International Harvester, we noted that our analysis was in
harmony with that of the United States Supreme Court on
the issue of the right to a jury trial in civil cases when
equitable issues are also involved. International Harvester,
626 P.2d at 421 n.2. In the federal courts, there is no
question that when legal and equitable issues turn on the
same operative facts, a jury must decide the legal issue first;
the jury's factual determination binds the trial court in its
determination of the parallel equitable issue. [Citations
omitted.] We approve of this procedure.

The trial court should have allowed the jury to decide the
material, fraudulent alteration issue, and as to the two notes
creating the line of credit, the Court should not have ruled
on enforcement, the right to collateral, or foreclosure until it
had the jury's verdict. 7/ should then have deferred to that
verdict in making its rulings.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Zions decision was decided 10 years after the Romrell decision. Once again,
it is interesting to note that the Romrell decision is not once cited in the Zions decision,
suggesting that Romrell was never intended to be a ruling on the issues presented by
this appeal.
The trial judge in this case committed error in concluding that this case is an
equity case as opposed to a mixed case containing equitable claims and legal claims.
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Legal counsel for Goldberg and Meehan assert that Valley Mortuary, International
Harvester and Zions are not controlling of this appeal because Goldberg and Meehan's
legal claim for damages was intended to be as an alternative to the equitable relief
sought when, on the other hand, Valley Mortuary, International Harvester and Zions
involved legal claims that were asserted in addition to the equitable claims. This
distinction made by opposing counsel is one without any relevant meaning in relation to
this appeal and is certainly not a distinction that was made by the court in Romrell.
Regardless of whether the legal claim is asserted as an alternative to the equitable
claim or in addition to the equitable claim, the fact remains that when a legal claim is
being submitted for decision, the Utah Constitution protects a party's right to a trial by
jury not only on the legal claim but also on the underlying factual questions presented
by such claim; that is, unless the parties waive this protection, as was the case in
Romrell.
As the Dugan, Valley Mortuary, International Harvester, and Zions cases hold, the
constitutional right to a trial by jury in civil cases must be protected even in cases
where the legal claim is incidental to an equitable claim. The only feasible way of
protecting that right is to require that the jury not only decide the legal claim but also
that the jury determine the factual questions underlying the legal claim. If the jury's
determination on questions of fact has bearing upon the equitable claim, the jury's
-12-

finding of fact is binding and the court must defer to that finding in deciding the
eqi lit able claim.

' . ,. ..-: ••

•' .'

•' . ' : •

•' •;.'

Although not expressly stated in any of the cases cited above, the policy reasons
are clear for applying the jury's factual determinations not only to the legal issues but
also to the Court's C * .mination of the equita"

d

to justify its ruling on an equitable issue by entering findings of fact that are
.JUS findings on a legal issue, it would no doubt cause
both the court and the jury to be reduced in stature in the perception of both the
public and participants in legal proceedings. It is quite troubling to believe that two

purposes; the jury's version being applicable to the legal issues and the judge's version
being applicable to the equitable issues. For example, .-

, T- *.

<m > findings of

fact and order were allowed to stand in the case at hr"
inconsistent findings of fact; namely, (1) the jury's finding that Timmons did not violate

and (2) the trial court's inconsistent finding ih:\i tfu - n

i !•«*;,

r the CC&Rs

for purposes of Goldberg and Meehan ^ ^Aiin* -.-^ ajunctive relief, i h natural
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the ruling of the jury or the ruling of the trial court would be criticized as being based
upon the "corrupt" set of facts as opposed to the "true" set of facts.
Moreover, if this Court were to uphold the trial court's ruling, it could lead to
abuse. In cases where a claimant wants a trial by the court rather than a trial by jury,
the claimant could start asserting alternative equitable claims in every possible case so
as to undermine the adverse parties' constitutional right to a trial by jury on the legal
issues.
In conclusion, the trial court committed error by disregarding the jury's findings
of fact and entering its own inconsistent findings of fact. In so doing, the trial court
not only deprived Timmons of his constitutional right to trial by jury of the legal issues
and underlying facts, it also failed to follow the procedure adopted in Zions; namely, it
failed to follow the jury's findings of fact on the legal issue in its "determination of the
parallel equitable issue." Zions, 795 P.2d at 602.
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POINT HI: THE PARTIES D m NOT CONSENT TO THE JURY ACTING AS AN
ADVISORY JURY.
Goldberg and Meehan assert that Timmons consented to
advisory jury when the following dialogue with the court occurred following the jury

The jury returned their verdict and were discharged.
T H E

C O U R T :

M

righ^

G e n t l e m e n

Mr. Winterholler, would you please prepare an
Order/Judgment of the court consistent with tH
verdict,
MR. WINTERHOLLERi I will, Yor~

TT

mor,

THE COUR1: And then is there ai,
that this court needs to do about this case?
MR. WINTERHOLLERi You need to determine
whether or not you independently wish to award Injunctive
Relief and also you need to address the issue of the
appropriateness of the ammount [sic] of fees.
THE COURT: How did you wish to handle that?
Why don't you, unless you really want oral argument;why
[sic] don't you submit a memorandum and let the court
decide at that point whether I desire some oral argument on
that? And that would be the issue of attornie's [sic] fees
and submit an affidavit together with your argument, that
you're entitled to it. And then any opposition to that, and
also your position with regard to Injunctive Relief?
MR. STRACHAN: Very well.

MR. WINTERHOLLER: We'll do that.
THE COURT: And in the court's findings the court
would need to make and how you want to handle that.
Would you please prepare a submission to the court within
the next ten days.
MR. WINTERHOLLER: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. And then give you five
days thereafter in which to respond.
MR. STRACHAN: That would be fine.
THE COURT: All right. That will be the Order.
The court will be in recess.
(R. 1786-88).
Taken in context, it is clear that rather than expressing consent to the jury being
treated as an advisory jury, legal counsel for Timmons was merely following the
procedure clearly established in Zions. In essence, Timmons, legal counsel was stating
that the trial court still needed to make a determination, albeit merely as a formality, on
the equitable issue even though the legal issue had been decided by the jury and the
factual determination of the jury in reaching the legal conclusion was, in effect,
determinative of the equitable claim.
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Zions:
[W]hen legal and equitable issues turn on the same
operative facts, a jury must decide the legal issue first; the
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jury's factual determination binds the trial court in its
determination of the parallel equitable issue.
Following the procedure in Zions, Timmons' legal counsel was merely requesting that
the trial court also order that Goldberg and Meehan's equitable claim for injunctive
relief b e denied bnsr.1 „„i

"

' " '

1 (I I, 11 ,„i,

Vftfts I I

(I

violated.
Rathei than showing ,...;. the parties consented to the jury acting in an advisory
capacity, the above dialogue between the trial judge and the parties' lep.al counsel,
taken in context, instead shows that the trial court and legal counsel viewed the jury's

legal counsel to "prepare an Order/Judgment of the court consistent with this jury's
verdict." (emphasis added). The trial judge then asks if there is anything further that
the court needs to do about the case. Qearlj if till s ti ial ji i ige ha ;:1 ah • z adj • decided
that the jury was acting in an advisory capacity, he would know that he still had to
clrdcle whr"1 i

. i I'J -

M

JI i

"L juij > a'liL'i

.. ''

' • .. .:. .

.

. ' -.'

In addition, if Goldberg and Meehan's legal counsel had already decided prior to
the jury verdict that they wanted the jury treated as an advisory jury, they surely would
have said something whei» 'hi 1 jury's vf?*d"« i nu'iii *|

' "l > '

lii» iii-ni thtM'

mention by anybody about the jury being "advisory." T h e record indicates that the

concept of the jury being treated as "advisory" was an afterthought by Goldberg and
Meehan and it was not presented to the trial court until well after the jury had
rendered its verdict.

CONCLUSION
Goldberg and Meehan's legal claim for monetary damages was properly
submitted to the jury. In fact, Timmons had a constitutional right to have Goldberg
and Median's legal claim for damages decided by a jury. Under Zions, International
Harvester, Dugan and Valley Mortuary, Timmons also has a right to have the jury's
determination of facts also be binding on the court's ruling on Goldberg and Meehan's
equitable claim. Because the jury found no breach of the CC&Rs, Goldberg and
Meehan clearly are not entitled to any equitable relief. As a result, this case should be
remanded with the instructions that the judgment on the jury verdict be entered and
that Goldberg and Meehan's equitable claim be denied based upon the jury's findings
of fact and also with the instruction that Timmons is the prevailing party in this action
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and that attorneys* fees should be awarded upon presentation ol the piool >ll I h e s a m e
•5 ti ial

c ::: 11 11 1:
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DATED this / — day of November, 1994.
Respci

emitted,

KIRTON & McCONKIE

*au] H. Matthews
Merrill F. Nelson
Daniel V. Goodsell
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants

-19-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this VS5T day of November, 1994, two true and correct
copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was mailed by United
States mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Gordon C. Strachan, Esq.
Todd D. Wakefield, Esq.
STRACHAN & STRACHAN
528 Main Street
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